Rating: HOLD
HOLD (5-tier) · cyclical compounder · conviction: low
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Current Price | $275 |
| Triangulated Fair Value | $218 (-21% vs spot · triangulated FV) |
| 12-mo Scenario PWEV | $280 (+2% vs spot · 12m PWEV) |
| Forward P/E | 37.0x |
| Market Cap | $25B |
| 52-Week Range | $129–$294 |
EPS basis for the forward P/E and all scenario multiples: consensus forward EPS (broker-adjusted, non-GAAP).
Methodology: Valuation triangulated across five independent anchors — Monte Carlo (Student-t + regime switching), an independent DCF, peer re-rating, a sum-of-parts, and a scenario-weighted PWEV. Figures reconciled to Alpha Vantage 2026-06-27. Each chart below sits with the part of the thesis it evidences.
General research for a skeptical institutional reader. Not personalised investment advice; no position sizing or trade instructions. Figures as of the analysis date; verify before acting.
Investment Committee Summary
| Rating | HOLD · HOLD (5-tier) |
| Classification · conviction | cyclical compounder · low |
| Triangulated fair value | $218 (-21% vs spot · triangulated FV) |
| 12-mo scenario PWEV | $280 (+2% vs spot · 12m PWEV) |
| Next catalyst | 2026-07-15 — Quarterly earnings |
| Primary thesis-break | Intermodal segment operating margin < 0.055 (2 consecutive prints) |
📎 Download the full model (Excel) — DCF line items, scenarios, sensitivity, assumptions, and extended fundamentals.
Rating Bridge
Rating = HOLD because:
- Probability-weighted scenario value implies +2% vs spot
- Monte Carlo median implies -10% vs spot
- DCF fair value implies -39% vs spot — but this is terminal-value sensitive (exit-multiple $168 vs Gordon $95, 43% apart), so it carries less weight
- Bear case (Structural — Freight-Margin Reset / Disintermediation) downside is -59% vs spot
- Net: reward/risk of 0.3× is not asymmetric enough for a Buy and not impaired enough for a Sell — hence Hold.
Investment Thesis
At $289.43 JB Hunt trades on roughly 39 times forward earnings, a multiple that prices a quality compounder already through the freight trough and re-accelerating. The market is paying a premium for intermodal density, the dedicated contract ballast and a disciplined balance sheet carrying only $1.3B of net debt. The engine is less convinced. Its base case assumes 4% revenue growth and a 6.9% operating margin, delivering EPS near $7.46, close to the Monte Carlo median of $7.42, and a probability-weighted target of $282, a touch below spot. Variance is dominated by margin (60%) and the multiple (36%), not volume. The rating is HOLD because the base target and current price are within 3%, and only a 40% share of simulations finish above today's price. The single most damaging risk is that intermodal is not merely trough-earning but structurally re-rating lower as digital brokers compress brokerage economics and yields fail to recover, dragging both earnings and the multiple toward the reset path near $112.
The dashboard below is the whole argument on one page: spot ($275) against each valuation anchor, the scenario tree, technicals and the options-implied move.
Anti-Thesis (The Real Bear Case)
The highest-probability bear is the base case failing downward into a freight recession, weighted 0.17 plus the 0.20 structural tail. The mechanism is straightforward: capacity stays loose, contract renewals reprice down, and intermodal loads fall while the fixed rail-and-chassis cost base does not, so margin under-earns the assumed 6.9%. At a 6.0% margin on flat-to-negative volume, EPS falls to roughly $6.11. A 39-times multiple cannot survive falling earnings and a cyclical de-rate together; the two compress in tandem, taking the target toward $208. The paused capex through 2025 flatters near-term free cash flow but signals management already sees a soft market, and the balance sheet is net-levered rather than net-cash.
Key Debate
Gross Margin explains 60% of Monte Carlo outcome variance — the single variable that decides which side is right.
Earnings-Call Disconfirmation & Sentiment
Derived signals from the MCH market-data store (Alpha Vantage transcripts + news). Quantitative tone only — a disconfirmation flag, not a substitute for reading the call.
Management vs analyst tone (2026Q1): management +0.61 vs analyst floor +0.00 → delta +0.61 (n=27 mgmt / 10 Q&A; 90th pctile across the S&P book, z +1.4).
Flag: ELEVATED — management unusually upbeat vs the analyst floor relative to peers (disconfirmation watch).
| Quarter | Mgmt | Analyst | Delta |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026Q1 | +0.61 | +0.00 | +0.61 |
| 2025Q4 | +0.34 | +0.04 | +0.30 |
| 2025Q3 | +0.50 | +0.05 | +0.45 |
| 2025Q2 | +0.49 | +0.19 | +0.30 |
News (last 365d, 1000 articles): avg ticker sentiment +0.19 (bullish 29% / bearish 3%)
Scenario Analysis
The tree runs from a structural 'Structural — Freight-Margin Reset / Disintermediation' downside ($112) to a 'Bull — Re-Rate' bull case ($500); the probability-weighted blend (PWEV $280) is +2% versus spot.
| Scenario | Probability | Target | Return vs spot |
|---|---|---|---|
| Structural — Freight-Margin Reset / Disintermediation | 20% | $112 | -59% |
| Freight Recession | 17% | $208 | -24% |
| Base — Volume + Yield Normalisation | 35% | $294 | +7% |
| Upcycle — Tight Capacity / E-Com Volumes | 20% | $394 | +43% |
| Bull — Re-Rate | 8% | $500 | +82% |
| Probability-Weighted (PWEV) | — | $280 | +2% |
Scenario rationale — what each probability buys (the driver path behind every target):
- Structural — Freight-Margin Reset / Disintermediation (20%, $112). Structural impairment — freight-margin reset / disintermediation: earnings AND the multiple compress together. Target sits below the 52-week low by construction. Drivers — implied_target: 109.89; probability: 0.2.
- Freight Recession (17%, $208). Cyclical downturn — freight volumes + yields (parcel/LTL/forwarding) + the freight cycle + fuel weakens for 1–2 years before normalising. Drivers — implied_target: 213.31; probability: 0.17.
- Base — Volume + Yield Normalisation (35%, $294). Mid-cycle — normalised freight volumes + yields (parcel/LTL/forwarding) + the freight cycle + fuel; disciplined capital allocation; steady returns. Drivers — implied_target: 296.27; probability: 0.35.
- Upcycle — Tight Capacity / E-Com Volumes (20%, $394). Upside — tight capacity + e-com volumes lifts earnings above mid-cycle; the multiple expands modestly. Drivers — implied_target: 399.96; probability: 0.2.
- Bull — Re-Rate (8%, $500). Upside tail — sustained tight conditions or a structural re-rate on tight capacity + e-com volumes. Drivers — implied_target: 505.14; probability: 0.08.
Valuation Triangulation
Five anchors — but read them with their basis in mind. The Monte Carlo, the DCF terminal, and the peer re-rate all key off a market multiple, so they are not fully independent; only the discounted cash flows themselves are genuinely multiple-free. The discipline is to read the spread and weight the cash-based view, not to treat five numbers as five independent votes.
| Method | Basis | Fair Value | vs Spot |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monte Carlo median (Student-t + regime) | multiple | $248 | -10% |
| Peer P/E re-rate | multiple | $196 | -29% |
| Peer EV/Revenue re-rate | multiple | $386 | +40% |
| Scenario PWEV | multiple | $280 | +2% |
| DCF (5-year + terminal) | cash flow + terminal × | $168 | -39% |
| Triangulated (weighted) | — | $218 | -21% |
Peer EV/Revenue re-rate — 0% weight: it duplicates the peer-multiple information already carried by the Peer P/E anchor while ignoring margin mix; weighting both would double-count the peer view. Shown as a cross-check.
Rating vs blend — the key debate. The rating tracks the multiple-discipline fair value (Monte Carlo $248 + scenario PWEV $280, ≈ spot); the weighted blend $218 (-21%) sits below it because the cash-flow DCF ($168) is materially more conservative than the market multiple. Whether the current multiple is justified is the central question for this name — and the principal downside risk to the rating.
Monte Carlo — the distribution, not a point
10,000 paths, Student-t shocks (fat tails) with a regime-switching overlay. The median lands at $248 and 43% of paths finish above spot. The variance decomposition shows the gross margin is the dominant swing factor (60% of variance). The fundamental driver, not the multiple, sets the spread — a cleaner setup.
DCF — the cash-flow anchor
Independent of the market multiple: a 5-year path, WACC 9.0%, 30x terminal FCF multiple → $168. This anchor is deliberately the heaviest (41%): it is the valuation least hostage to the current multiple regime.
Peer benchmarking — relative value
Against the peer cohort, re-rating to the peer-median forward multiple (P/E 26.325000000000003x) implies $196. A premium is only justified by superior growth/margins; otherwise it is multiple risk. Weighted just 12% so the market's mood does not drive the fair value.
Across all anchors the spread is 88% of the median — wide (genuine disagreement — the blend carries low valuation confidence).
Revenue-Segment Breakdown
The company-specific drivers behind the valuation — each segment carries its own growth, margin, multiple and capex intensity. (Tags: FACT reported · ESTIMATE from disclosures · INFERENCE judgment.)
| Segment | Revenue | Mix | Growth | Op margin | EBIT | Multiple | Capex % | Tag |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Freight & Logistics | $12.1B | 100% | 4% | 7% | $0.8B | 38x | 6% | ESTIMATE |
| EBIT = segment revenue × operating margin (segment EBITDA not shown — per-segment D&A is not separately disclosed). |
Named Exposures
Demand & pricing cycle (FACT/ESTIMATE)
| Dimension | Assessment |
|---|---|
| driver | freight volumes + yields (parcel/LTL/forwarding) + the freight cycle + fuel |
| net_debt_or_cash_b | -1.3 |
Capital intensity & shareholder returns (ESTIMATE)
| Dimension | Assessment |
|---|---|
| capex_pct_revenue | 0.06 |
| div_yield | 0.0066 |
Structural risk vs optionality (INFERENCE)
| Dimension | Assessment |
|---|---|
| downside | freight-margin reset / disintermediation |
| upside | tight capacity + e-com volumes |
Industry Context — Ind Transport
This name sits in the Ind Transport as a freight_logistics. freight volumes + yields (parcel/LTL/forwarding) + the freight cycle + fuel Its scenarios are not guessed in isolation — they inherit a single, shared view of the cluster's driver cycle, so the names that depend on the same event are mutually consistent.
Value chain: UNP (rails) · UPS (freight_logistics) · CSX (rails) · FDX (freight_logistics) · NSC (rails) · DAL (airlines) · ODFL (freight_logistics) · UAL (airlines) · JBHT (freight_logistics) · LUV (airlines) · FDXF (freight_logistics) · EXPD (freight_logistics) · CHRW (freight_logistics)
| Shared state | Capex path | House view | This name implies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Freight / Travel Recession | 38% | 37% | |
| Mid-Cycle — Volume + Yield Normalisation | 34% | 35% | |
| Upcycle — Tight Capacity / Strong Demand | 28% | 28% |
Mapping note: name-level 'Structural — Freight-Margin Reset / Disintermediation' (20%) + 'Freight Recession' (17%) map to cluster Freight / Travel Recession (37%); name-level 'Upcycle — Tight Capacity / E-Com Volumes' (20%) + 'Bull — Re-Rate' (8%) map to cluster Upcycle — Tight Capacity / Strong Demand (28%) — the cluster row is the SUM of the mapped scenario probabilities, not a different estimate.
On the cluster's key downside — Freight / Travel Recession () — this name implies 37% vs the cluster house view of 38% (in line with the house). The cluster's full cross-stock reconciliation governs that the names which ride the same capex cycle assign it comparable odds.
Structure: Shared State — The ind_transport cycle is the shared macro driver. Driver — freight volumes & yields + passenger demand + the transport cycle + fuel/labor Dispersion — Members differ by cyclicality (quality compounders vs deep cyclicals).
Model Appendix
DCF — line items
| Year | Revenue | Op income | − Capex | + D&A | FCF | PV(FCF) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY+1 | $13B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $1B |
| FY+2 | $13B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $1B |
| FY+3 | $14B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $1B |
| FY+4 | $14B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $0B |
| FY+5 | $14B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $1B | $0B |
| Terminal | — | — | — | — | $1B × 30x | $14B |
FCF is bridged: NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC (capex intensity 6% of revenue, weighted from the segments) — not a single conversion fudge.
WACC 9.0% · Σ PV(FCF) $3B + PV(terminal) $14B = EV $17B; + net cash → equity $15B ÷ diluted shares 0.09B = $168/share (exit-multiple terminal).
- Gordon (perpetuity-growth) terminal at 2.5% → $95/share — a genuinely non-multiple, cash-based cross-check; the exit-multiple and Gordon values bracket the terminal-value risk.
- Incremental ROIC on the forecast capex ≈ 3% vs WACC 9% → below WACC — the incremental build is value-dilutive.
Peer set
| Peer | EV/Rev | Fwd P/E | Growth | Op margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ODFL | 8.34x | 40.49x | 4% | 24% |
| FDXF | 2.893x | 31.55x | 4% | 6% |
| LUV | 0.988x | 16.67x | 4% | 4% |
| XYL | 3.197x | 21.1x | 5% | 13% |
| Median | 3.045x | 26.325000000000003x | — | — |
Peer-median fwd P/E → $196; EV/Rev → $386.
Weighted fair-value math
| Anchor | Value | Weight | Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCF | $168 | 41% | $69 |
| Scenario PWEV | $280 | 29% | $82 |
| Monte Carlo median | $248 | 18% | $44 |
| Peer P/E | $196 | 12% | $23 |
| Triangulated | — | 100% | $218 |
Sensitivity
DCF/share — WACC × terminal multiple
| WACC \ Term× | 21.0x | 25.5x | 30.0x | 34.5x | 39.0x |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7% | $134 | $159 | $184 | $209 | $235 |
| 8% | $128 | $152 | $176 | $200 | $224 |
| 9% | $122 | $145 | $168 | $191 | $214 |
| 10% | $116 | $138 | $160 | $182 | $204 |
| 11% | $111 | $132 | $153 | $174 | $195 |
DCF/share — revenue CAGR Δ × op-margin Δ
| CAGRΔ \ MgnΔ | -3.0pp | -1.5pp | +0.0pp | +1.5pp | +3.0pp |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -3.0pp | $68 | $104 | $141 | $178 | $215 |
| -1.5pp | $75 | $115 | $154 | $194 | $233 |
| +0.0pp | $83 | $126 | $168 | $210 | $252 |
| +1.5pp | $92 | $137 | $182 | $227 | $273 |
| +3.0pp | $101 | $149 | $198 | $246 | $294 |
Tornado — DCF/share swing by driver (widest first)
| Driver | Low | High | Swing |
|---|---|---|---|
| Op margin ±3pp | $83 | $252 | $169 |
| Capex intensity ±15% | $132 | $204 | $71 |
| Revenue CAGR ±3pp | $141 | $198 | $56 |
| Terminal × ±15% | $145 | $191 | $46 |
| WACC ±1pp | $160 | $176 | $16 |
Company lever — SoP/share vs Freight & Logistics multiple (AI re-rating) (base 38x)
| Multiple | 26.6x | 32.3x | 38.0x | 43.7x | 49.4x |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SoP/share | $3,484 | $4,234 | $4,984 | $5,733 | $6,483 |
Consensus & Market Expectations
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| Street target (mean) | $258 (-6% vs spot · street) |
| House target | $282 (+9.5% vs street) |
| Sell-side coverage | 23 analysts (SB 2 / B 11 / H 9 / S 1 / SS 0; net score 0.3) |
| Consensus FY EPS | $9.22; house below (-19.4%) |
| Consensus FY revenue | $13.9B; house below (-9.5%) |
_Consensus figures: Alpha Vantage sell-side aggregates. Where the house view sits materially above or below the street, the divergence is itself a datum — see the thesis.
Balance Sheet & Liquidity
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.9B — modestly levered |
| Net debt / EBITDA | 1.16x |
| Interest coverage (EBIT / interest) | 12.2x |
| Current ratio | 0.83x |
| Cash & ST investments | $0.0B |
Balance-sheet data as of 2025-12-31 (Alpha Vantage).
Capital Allocation
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Free cash flow | $0.9B |
| Buybacks / dividends | $0.9B / $0.2B |
| Total shareholder yield | 4.4% |
| Payout as % of FCF | 118.0% |
| Reinvestment (capex / OCF) | 43.6% |
| SBC as % of FCF | 7.6% |
| Allocation stance | returning more than FCF (balance-sheet funded) |
Free-Cash-Flow Quality
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| FCF margin | 7.8% |
| FCF conversion (FCF / net income) | 158.5% |
| FCF yield | 3.7% |
| Capex intensity (capex / revenue) | 6.0% |
| FCF − SBC (diagnostic) | $0.9B |
| Capex split (maint / growth) | 55% / 45% — Asset-heavier than a pure broker at ~6% capex/revenue; roughly half sustains and replaces the container/tractor fleet and terminals, with a large growth slice funding dedicated-fleet expansion and container-count additions tied to volume. |
Accounting quality: SBC 0.6% of revenue; cash conversion (OCF/NI) 281% — cash-backed.
Catalyst Calendar
- 2026-07-15 (~7d) — Quarterly earnings — est. EPS $1.70 (AV EARNINGS_CALENDAR)
- 2026-09-22 (~76d) — Freight-cycle inflection watch — spot-vs-contract spread and capacity tightening (authored)
- 2026-12-03 (~148d) — Analyst / investor day on intermodal margin-recovery path and dedicated-fleet growth targets (authored)
- 2027-01-20 (~196d) — Annual intermodal contract-rate (bid-season) renewal outcome (authored)
Forecast Track Record
- EPS surprise: beat 75.0% of the last 8 quarters; average surprise +2.7%.
Competitive Moat
Narrow moat. JB Hunt's moat is intermodal network density (the BNSF rail relationship and largest domestic-container fleet) plus dedicated-contract switching costs — a real but cyclical-margin advantage — which supports a terminal multiple modestly above the transport average but not the ~39x forward multiple currently paid; the falsifiable claim is that if intermodal operating margin fails to recover above ~10% as the freight cycle turns, the moat is only narrow and the terminal multiple should compress toward the rails/truckers' mid-teens.
Moat sources:
- Largest domestic intermodal container fleet and long-standing BNSF rail capacity relationship (scale + network density)
- Dedicated Contract Services long-term customer contracts with dedicated fleets (switching cost + revenue stability)
- Terminal and drayage network footprint that is costly for entrants to replicate
- Cyclical margin (freight-cycle sensitivity) as evidence the moat does not confer through-cycle pricing power
Regulatory & Legal Risk
| Issue | Probability | Valuation sensitivity | Horizon |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rail / STB regulation and BNSF service-level dependency affecting intermodal reliability and cost | low-to-medium (~30%) | medium - intermodal is the largest profit pool; a service/cost disruption is ~4-6% of FV | 12-24m |
| Driver-classification / labour (AB5-style) and emissions/EV-mandate rules raising drayage and fleet costs | low-to-medium (~30%) | low-to-medium - raises operating cost across dedicated/drayage; ~2-4% of FV | 12-24m |
Probabilities and sensitivities are analyst estimates, not market-implied.
Scenario Macro & Key Risks
| Scenario | Macro assumption | Key risk |
|---|---|---|
| Structural — Freight-Margin Reset / Disintermediation | Digital brokerage, shipper insourcing and rail-direct programs permanently compress intermodal and brokerage margins, resetting the through-cycle profit pool lower rather than cyclically. | The premium multiple assumes structurally higher margins return; if intermodal margin is permanently reset, both earnings and the multiple fall together. |
| Freight Recession | A prolonged freight recession keeps volumes and yields depressed across intermodal, dedicated and brokerage as goods demand and destocking persist. | Operating deleverage on the asset-heavy fleet, with a ~39x multiple pricing recovery, makes the downside acutely asymmetric. |
| Base — Volume + Yield Normalisation | The freight cycle troughs and normalises with low-single-digit volume growth and gradual yield recovery; ~6.9% operating margin. | Even a healthy normalisation may not justify 39x; the multiple, not the fundamentals, is the primary downside risk. |
| Upcycle — Tight Capacity / E-Com Volumes | Truckload capacity tightens, spot rates rise, and e-commerce volumes push freight onto intermodal, restoring pricing power and margin. | Freight upcycles are short and hard to time; the window may close before the margin recovery fully flows through to earnings. |
| Bull — Re-Rate | A sustained capacity-constrained upcycle plus recognition of the dedicated-contract ballast drives further multiple expansion. | Expanding an already-39x multiple leaves essentially no margin of safety; any cycle disappointment or tape de-rate is severe. |
What the Market Is Pricing In
At the current price, the market pays 29.8× forward EPS, vs the house DCF terminal 30.0×, and a peer median 26.325000000000003×. The house DCF sits 39% below spot, so the market is pricing in more than the house case — roughly 3.5pp of revenue CAGR.
Variant perception: the house view is above-consensus, and the thesis is primarily event-driven.
| Metric | Consensus | House | Importance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 13.9 | 12.6 | High |
| EPS | 9.2 | 7.4 | Medium |
| Target price | 257.8 | 282.3 | Medium |
Peer Quality & Weighting
| Peer | Fwd P/E | Growth | Op margin | Quality | Weight cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ODFL | 40.49× | 4% | 24% | direct | 100% |
| FDXF | 31.55× | 4% | 6% | direct | 100% |
| LUV | 16.67× | 4% | 4% | segment | 50% |
| XYL | 21.1× | 5% | 13% | segment | 50% |
Quality-weighted forward P/E: 30.3× (simple median 26.325000000000003×). Direct peers count 100%, segment 50%, broad 25%.
Valuation-anchor screen: DCF (Gordon) (low-confidence cross-check (>50% below median)). Anchor median 195.6. Extreme/excluded anchors carry no headline weight.
Historical-range cross-check: 52-week range $129–$294, centre $195 (-29% vs spot); spot sits at the 89th percentile of the range. Low-weight mean-reversion cross-check, not a fundamental anchor.
Risk / Reward & Margin of Safety
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Upside to triangulated FV | $218 (-21% vs spot · triangulated FV) |
| Downside to bear case (Structural — Freight-Margin Reset / Disintermediation) | $112 (-59% vs spot · bear scenario) |
| Reward/risk ratio | 0.3× |
| Margin of safety (FV vs spot) | -26% |
| P(price > spot) — Monte Carlo | 43% |
Reward/risk compares triangulated upside against the probability-weighted bear target, not the extreme tail. Bull case (Bull — Re-Rate): $500.
Assumption Register
| Assumption | Value | Used in | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| WACC | 9.0% | DCF discount rate | estimate (CAPM) |
| Terminal multiple | 30× | DCF exit value | estimate (peer-anchored) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | DCF Gordon terminal | estimate |
| SBC dilution | 0.0%/yr | PWEV, MC, DCF (charged once) | estimate (from SBC/rev) |
| EPS basis | consensus forward EPS (broker-adjusted, non-GAAP) | all forward P/E & scenario multiples | definition |
Sensitivity-ranked drivers (widest fair-value swing first): Op margin ±3pp (169.0); Capex intensity ±15% (71.0); Revenue CAGR ±3pp (56.0); Terminal × ±15% (46.0); WACC ±1pp (16.0).
Inputs, Sources & Confidence
Every load-bearing input, labelled by type and confidence. (reported fact · company guidance · consensus estimate · market data · house estimate · inference.)
| Input | Value | Type | Source | Confidence | Used in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue TTM | $12.1B | reported fact | 10-K/10-Q via AV | High | Forecast base, EV/Rev |
| FY+1 guided revenue | $12.6B | company guidance | Company guidance | Medium | Forecast, SoP |
| Consensus FY EPS | $9.2162 | consensus estimate | Sell-side consensus via AV | Medium | Variant perception |
| Diluted shares | 0.092B | reported fact | 10-K via AV | High | Market cap, per-share |
| Net debt / cash | $1.872B | reported fact | Balance sheet via AV | High | EV, DCF equity bridge |
| WACC | 9.0% | house estimate | CAPM (beta/rf) | Medium | DCF discount rate |
| Terminal multiple | 30× | house estimate | Peer/historical range | Medium | DCF exit value |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | house estimate | Long-run GDP+ | Medium | DCF Gordon terminal |
Source Log
| Source | Type | Date | Used for | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alpha Vantage — GLOBAL_QUOTE / OVERVIEW | market data | 2026-07-08 | Price, market cap, EV, 52-week range, forward P/E | Alpha Vantage 2026-06-27 |
| Company income statement (10-K / 10-Q) via Alpha Vantage | reported fact | 2026-07-08 | Revenue, gross/operating margin, EBIT, interest expense | INCOME_STATEMENT / latest annual |
| Company balance sheet (10-K / 10-Q) via Alpha Vantage | reported fact | 2026-07-08 | Cash, debt, net debt, leases, equity, coverage | BALANCE_SHEET / latest annual |
| Company cash-flow statement (10-K / 10-Q) via Alpha Vantage | reported fact | 2026-07-08 | Operating cash flow, capex, FCF, buybacks, dividends, SBC | CASH_FLOW / latest annual |
| Company earnings releases via Alpha Vantage | reported fact | 2026-07-08 | Reported EPS, surprise history | EARNINGS / quarterly |
| Sell-side consensus via Alpha Vantage | consensus estimate | 2026-07-08 | Forward revenue/EPS consensus, analyst count | EARNINGS_ESTIMATES |
| Earnings calendar via Alpha Vantage | market data | 2026-07-08 | Next earnings date, catalyst timing | EARNINGS_CALENDAR |
| Company guidance | company guidance | 2026-07-08 | FY guided revenue / non-GAAP EPS basis | company guidance / earnings call |
| MCH segment model (from filings & disclosures) | house estimate | 2026-07-08 | Segment revenue, margins, multiples, AI decomposition | company_context (authored, tagged) |
| MCH qualitative analysis | inference | 2026-07-08 | Moat, regulatory risk, scenario macro, catalysts | company_context enrichment (authored) |
| MCH investment thesis & falsification triggers | house estimate | 2026-07-08 | Thesis, anti-thesis, thesis-break signals | authored §5.3 |
Citation coverage: 13/14 mandated claims sourced. Filing URLs are not available via the market-data provider; company statements are cited as 10-K/10-Q via Alpha Vantage.
Load-Bearing Assumptions
DCF: WACC 9%, terminal multiple 30×, FY+5 revenue $14B. Triangulation leans 41% on DCF, 29% on PWEV.
Reasons the Thesis Could Fail (Falsifiable)
Pre-registered signals that would break the thesis — each polices a specific scenario boundary and is checked at every earnings update:
- Intermodal segment operating margin < 0.055 (2 consecutive prints → Freight / Travel Recession). Intermodal is the earnings core. A sustained sub-5.5% segment margin sits below the base 6.9% and toward the structural-reset path, signalling the through-cycle mean has stepped down rather than troughed.
- Intermodal load count year-on-year < -0.03 (2 consecutive prints → Freight / Travel Recession). Volume, not price, drives intermodal density. Loads falling more than 3% for two quarters is consistent with the freight-recession path rather than base normalisation and pressures fixed-cost absorption.
- Dedicated Contract Services net truck additions per quarter < 0 (2 consecutive prints → Freight / Travel Recession). Dedicated is the contracted, counter-cyclical ballast. Net fleet shrinkage for two quarters removes the stabiliser the base case leans on and shifts the mix toward the more cyclical intermodal and brokerage lines.
- Integrated Capacity Solutions (brokerage) gross margin < 0.12 (2 consecutive prints → Freight / Travel Recession). Digital brokerage entrants are the disintermediation vector. A brokerage gross margin held below 12% for two quarters would evidence structural price competition rather than a cyclical dip, supporting the reset path.
- Consolidated operating income year-on-year < -0.15 (2 consecutive prints → Freight / Travel Recession). A consolidated operating-income decline steeper than 15% for two consecutive quarters is inconsistent with mid-cycle normalisation and would pull the earnings base toward the freight-recession EPS of roughly $6.11.
- Annual capital expenditure > 1.4 (single event → Freight / Travel Recession). Capex reverting toward the $1.4B-plus levels of 2022–2023 without matching volume growth would signal capital deployed into a soft market, depressing incremental ROIC (engine base 3.4%) and free cash flow versus the disciplined-allocation assumption.
Fact / Inference / Speculation
- FACT: Spot $275; 52-week range $129–$294; engine rating HOLD; base-case target $282 (+3%). (source: Alpha Vantage 2026-06-27, 8 July 2026)
- INFERENCE: Triangulated FV $218 (-21% vs spot · triangulated FV); the rating tracks the Monte-Carlo + scenario-PWEV core; the cash-flow anchor sits below the multiple-discipline core.
- SPECULATION: At current prices the embedded bet is that Gross Margin keeps surprising favourably — an operating call the next two prints will test.
Recommendation: HOLD
Balanced: triangulated fair value $218 (-21% vs spot); the outcome hinges on Gross Margin. The debate is Gross Margin — a fundamental call.
Disclosures & Limitations
This report is for informational and research purposes only. It is not personalised investment advice and does not consider any investor's objectives, financial situation, risk tolerance, tax position, or liquidity needs.
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